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Nonbanks in the Payments System:  
Vertical Integration Issues 
 
1. Complementarity Between Merchants and Payment Systems 
A well functioning payment systems marketplace must recognize the 
complementary relationship between merchants and payment systems, and built an 
efficient market mechanism that utilizes this complementarity.  At the completion of a 
sale, money changes hands.  Money changing hands could be in cash or checks, and, for 
the last few decades, it could also be in electronically-transmitted funds or a guarantee of 
prompt electronic payment to the merchant.  Such electronic payments could come from 
a company that provides credit to customers (such as a bank organized under the Visa or 
MasterCard trade names) or from a company that just facilitates transactions (such as 
American Express) but typically does not provide credit, or directly from the bank where 
the customer has demand deposits.1  The “payment system” facilitates the payment to the 
merchant by guaranteeing that the money is received by the merchant and at the same 
time can offer a variety of services to the cardholder, ranging from credit services to 
frequent flyer miles.  Irrespective of all these additional services, the main service of a 
payment system is always complementary to the sale of goods.  The left panel of Figure 1 
shows a payment platform that is complementary to many merchants.  Similarly, a 
merchant typically accepts many payment systems platforms as shown in the right panel 
of Figure 1.  
 
                                                 
1 Although credit and non-credit cards started as single-store cards or one-type of goods (e.g. travel 
services) cards, they quickly evolved to payment systems that are used in a large variety of transactions. 
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Figure 1:  A Payment System is Complementary with Merchant Services 
 
2. Relative Power in the Relationship Between Merchants and Platforms; 
Markets Within a Payments Platform 
The relative power between firms providing complementary components is 
crucial in determining the way that the surplus created by transactions (sales) is divided 
between the owners of the complementary components, the market organization of these 
components, as well as the ownership structure and the extent of integration of 
ownership.  In principle there is no obvious or standard split of surplus in a network of 
complementary components.  What accrues to the payment system and what remains 
with the merchants is the result of the relative market power between merchants and 
payment systems (and their associations).  In turn, the extent of market power in the 
market for payments depends on the extent of competition between payment systems.  In 
a multi-party credit card association, such as Visa or MasterCard, merchants deal directly 
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with “acquirers” that intermediate transactions to “issuers” who issue cards to consumers 
and who ultimately send bills to customers.  The acquirers and the issuers are typically 
banks playing different roles in facilitating the transactions.  Thus, a transaction between 
a customer and a merchant done through Visa or MasterCard is intermediated by both an 
acquiring bank and an issuing bank.  In principle, there are three markets in each such 
transaction, and the surplus for each transaction is divided among these markets.  The 
three markets are: (i) between the merchant and the acquirer; (ii) between the acquirer 
and the issuer; and (iii) between the issuer and the consumer.  These are three markets for 
complementary products where the surplus generated by a transaction will have to be 
split.  The way surplus will be split depends on the relative market power in each of these 
three markets.  The extent of market power in each market depends on competition 
among firms participating in them.  Therefore it would not be surprising to see large 
merchants negotiate special pricing arrangements with card networks.2  
 The price in the market between acquirers and issuers (the interchange fee) is set 
by the association to which issuers and acquirers belong (MasterCard or Visa) and is not 
negotiated bilaterally between an issuing bank and an acquiring bank.  The fact that this 
fee is set collectively may imply a price floor for the overall fee that merchants pay to the 
payment system.3
                                                 
2 Additionally, some large merchants might find little value to the services of acquirers and may want to 
bypass them completely.  Michael Cook of Wal-Mart stated at the Kansas Federal Reserve Conference in 
Santa Fe (May 3, 2007) that Wal-Mart has tried unsuccessfully to bypass acquiring banks and deal directly 
with credit card issuing banks.   
 
3 This has been a litigation issue.  An additional lawsuit by major retailers including Walgreens, Kroger, 
Safeway, and Ahold alleges that Visa illegally ties payment services (such as the routing and processing of 
transactions) with various other services (payment guarantee, float, and network marketing, among others). 
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 Additionally, the two-sided aspect of the payment systems market does not imply 
that antitrust cannot or should not be applied to this market, or that its application should 
be quite different than in other markets.   
 
3. Incentives for Vertical Mergers 
Merchants could extent vertically in payment systems.4  See Figure 2.  To assess 
value of a vertical merger between firms or a vertical extension of a firm we need to 
analyze the pre-merger and post-merger equilibria.  There are many possibilities 
depending on concentration and market power in each market. 
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Figure 2: Vertical Merger or Vertical Extension of a Merchant in Payment 
Platform 1. 
 
3.1 Balanced Market Power 
                                                 
4 Wal-Mart has tried to open an industrial-loan bank to be able provide financial services, including issuing 
credit cards.  Wal-Mart withdrew its application after considerable opposition from commercial banks.  On 
June 20, 2007, Wal-Mart announced that it will start selling a Visa debit card under its name.  See Wall 
Street Journal, June 20, 2007. 
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We first focus on a market with balanced market power between merchants and 
payment systems.  For the moment, we assume full compatibility among the components.  
This means that any component can be combined with any other complementary 
component.  Compatibility implies higher demand for a component (because it can be 
combined with more complementary components), but it also implies more intense 
competition between substitute components.5  
The problem of vertical integration was first discussed by Cournot (1838).  He 
considered two independent monopolists producing two complementary products, A and 
B respectively, where A and B had no demand on their own but A combined with B was 
valuable.  Alternatively, he considered a single monopolist producing both A and B.  He 
showed that prices are higher when the two complementary goods are produced by 
independent monopolists.  Thus, a vertical merger of A with B results in lower prices, 
higher consumers’ surplus and higher profits, so it is desirable in every dimension.  
However, the effects of a vertical merger are much more complex when the ownership 
structure is not monopoly in both goods.6
Consider a merchant acquiring a payment platform (or creating its own) and using 
it preferentially (say offering discounts to customers using it).  In the setup shown in 
Figure 3, the merchants are A1 and A2 and the payment systems are B1 and B2.  If market 
power is balanced between merchants and payment systems, Economides and Salop 
(1992) have shown that prices are always lower in parallel vertical integration than in 
independent ownership. Additionally, a horizontal merger from parallel vertical 
integration to joint ownership “J” (where all four components A1, A2, B1, B2 are owned 
                                                 
5  See Economides (1989, 1991) discussing the incentives to be compatible with rivals.  
6  See Economides and Katsamakas (2006) for a discussion of competition in two-sided markets. 
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by the same firm) results in lower prices if and only if the composite goods are not close 
substitutes.  This is because, in this setup, there is a vertical aspect even in an apparently 
horizontal merger. 
 
 
Figure 3: Independent Ownership (“I”) and Parallel Vertical Integration (“PVA”). 
 
Now we assume incompatibility by contract or design, that is, a component is 
only compatible with one complementary component.  That is, A1B1 and A2B2 are 
feasible systems, but A1B2 and A2B1 are unfeasible or unavailable.  Figures 4a, 4b and 4c 
show the various ownership structures under incompatibility. 
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 Figure 4a:  Independent Ownership Market Structure under Incompatibility. 
 
 
Figure 4b: Partial Vertical Integration Ownership Market Structure 
under Incompatibility 
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 Figure 4c: Parallel Vertical Integration Ownership Market Structure Under 
Incompatibility 
 
 
Economides (2006) shows that starting with independent ownership, firms A1 and 
B1 will find a merger with each other to be profitable if and only if the composite goods 
A1B1 and A2B2 are far substitutes.  That is, vertical integration is not necessarily desirable 
for independent owners of complements.  Additionally, starting with partial vertical 
integration of firms A1 and B1 while firms A2 and B2 are independent, firms A2 and B2 
find a merger with each other profitable if and only if the composite goods A1B1 and 
A2B2 are not very close substitutes.  Again, vertical integration is not necessarily 
desirable for independent owners of complements.  Table 1 shows the equilibrium 
ownership structures.  In summary, when A1B1 and A2B2 are close substitutes, firms 
prefer to stay independent. 
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Table 1:  Equilibrium Outcomes in Potential Vertical Integration Mergers 
Non-cooperative Equilibrium Outcomes Substitution Between  
Composite Goods A1B1 and A2B2 
 
Parallel Vertical Integration 
 
Far 
Independent Ownership or 
Parallel Vertical Integration 
 
Intermediate 
Independent Ownership 
 
Close 
 
 
3.2 Unbalanced Market Power 
 We now consider the incentive for a vertical merger when facing concentration in 
a crucial complement.  As we will see, the incentive for a vertical merger is higher when 
a firm faces concentration in a crucial complement.  However, large merchants may be 
able to negotiate more favorable terms with payment platforms and therefore have a 
smaller incentive to get in the payment systems business. 
A merchant will see a vertical extension/merger as more profitable if it faces 
payments systems firms with significant market power which it may bypass through the 
vertical merger.  In general, a large merchant prefers a competitive market in payment 
systems because competition in payment systems would drive fees that merchants pay to 
a low level.  At the same time, merchants would like compatibility at the network level 
with all the competing payment systems, even if transactions are done for competing 
payment systems firms.  What merchants, especially large merchants, do not like is the 
high fees assessed to them as a result of the significant market power that credit card 
associations have.  Faced with significant market power in an adjacent market for 
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complementary services, large merchants have significant incentives to enter the payment 
systems market either through a vertical extension or by a vertical merger.7   Entering 
this market would most likely lead to a reduction in payment systems fees even if the 
majority of transactions are done through the network not owned by the large merchant.8  
As mentioned earlier, Wal-Mart has faced significant obstacles from banks in issuing a 
credit card. 
3.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Vertical Extension of a Company 
A good example of the advantages and disadvantages of vertical extension comes 
from Microsoft.  Its Windows operating system has 92% market share in operating 
systems for PCs.  Over time, it added functions to the operating system that used to be 
independent applications or middleware.  Among those are (i) the Internet Browser 
(Internet Explorer); (ii) Windows Media Player (WMA); (iii) Hard disk defragmenter; 
(iv) Anti-spyware protection; (v) Anti-virus protection.  But Microsoft has not entered the 
PC hardware market because it is aware of its core competencies. 
 An offensive advantage of extending the firm vertically is in the fact that it takes 
away value from complementary goods and adds value to its own product.  A defensive 
advantage of extending the firm vertically is in the fact that it avoids complementary 
goods firms creating a challenge to its own product.  For example, the Department of 
Justice and 20 States Attorneys General sued Microsoft based on the theory that the 
                                                 
7 Of course, such incentives are diminished if large merchants are offered special lower fees by payment 
systems networks. 
 
8 Similarly, in the secondary market for government bonds which was traditionally dominated by the 
broker-intermediated exchange of Cantor Fitzgerald with over 70% market share before 9/11/2001, four 
major clients of Cantor created Liberty as a competing exchange.  Very soon transaction fees were reduced 
to half by Cantor which retained its dominant market share.   
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Netscape browser together with Java could challenge the dominance of Windows, and 
therefore Microsoft killing Netscape was an attempt by Microsoft to illegally preserve its 
monopoly in operating systems for PCs.  Eventually Microsoft was found liable, even 
though it seemed very unlikely that Netscape could ever effectively challenge 
Microsoft’s monopoly.9
 The main disadvantage of some types of vertical extension is the legal liability it 
can entail.  For example, Microsoft was found liable under antitrust law for 
monopolization as described above.  Additionally, Microsoft was originally found liable 
by Judge Jackson for bundling of Internet Explorer with Windows but the judgment was 
reversed on appeal with specific instructions to the District Court for remand.  DOJ 
decided not to pursue the bundling claim under these rules.  However, a key claim of the 
present antitrust case of the European Union against Microsoft is the bundling of 
Windows Media Player with Windows.  Microsoft was found liable on this claim, which 
is presently under appeal.  Thus, some pricing strategies that directly follow from a 
vertical extension may be illegal, as in the Microsoft cases in the US and EU.  However, 
such strategies are likely to be legal if the market share of the relevant firms is relatively 
small and there is no conspiracy. 
Another problem of a vertical extension is that it could distract from the core 
competency of the firm.  Success of vertical extension varies.  For example, Microsoft’s 
vertical extension in Internet browsers was very successful in eliminating Netscape.  But 
Microsoft’s bundling of Windows Media Player with Windows has not resulted in 
elimination of alternative media players, as is evident in Figure 5. 
 
                                                 
9 For a detailed discussion of the Microsoft antitrust case see Economides (2001). 
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 Figure 5:  Market Penetration of PC Media Players 
4. Network Effects: Compatibility Issues 
Payment systems exhibit network effects.  There are special features of markets 
with network effects.  In brief, network effects are increasing returns to scale in 
consumption.   Formally, a market exhibits network effects when the value of an 
additional transaction is higher when more units change hands, everything else being 
equal.  Network effects arise from availability of complementary goods.  For example, 
Windows is more valuable when there are more applications for Windows, and this 
availability increases with the market share of Windows.  Similarly, the value of a credit 
card, say Visa, increases as more stores accept the card, and conversely, more stores are 
likely to accept the card when there are more cardholders of Visa. 
There is a crucial dichotomy in markets with network effects.  On the one hand 
we have networks with full compatibility.  On the other hand, we have networks with 
significant incompatibilities.  Typical examples of full compatibility networks are:  
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(i) Voice telecommunications (imposed by regulation) 
(ii) Internet data communications (from the original design) 
(iii) Fax (by design adhering to common standards) 
(iv) Cars and gasoline (by market evolution) 
(v) Tables and chairs (by market evolution) 
Typical examples of networks with incompatibilities are:  
(i) Operating Systems for PCs (Windows, Mac OS X, Linux) 
(ii) Game platforms (Xbox, Sony, Nintendo) 
(iii) Digital audio formats (iPod, Windows Media Player WMA, MP3, 
RealAudio) 
(iv) High definition DVDs (HD-DVD, Blu-ray) 
(v) Video players (Betamax, VHS) 
(vi) Information servers (Google, MSN, Yahoo, Yellow Pages) 
(vii) Financial and commodity exchanges 
(viii) Payment systems (some partially compatible) 
In payments systems, the cards are incompatible (you cannot do a transaction that 
is one side on the Visa network and on the other on the MasterCard network), but the 
competing cards often use the same network infrastructure.  Additionally, many 
consumers carry a number of credit cards.  Thus, we have multi-homing, and the effects 
of incompatibility on market structure are reduced.10
  
                                                 
10 See Economides (2007) for a discussion of public policy issues in network industries. 
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5. Additional Issues: Pricing in Markets with Network Effects 
In markets with network effects, firms can make money from either side of a 
network or from both sides.  In many software markets, a provider can make money from 
a server or a client.  For example, Abode sells Adobe Acrobat but distributes for free 
Adobe Reader.  Similarly, a telephone company can collect money from a caller (as is 
typical done on fixed telecommunications networks), a receiver of a phone call (for 
example in 800 numbers), or from both caller and receiver (for example cellular 
telephone calls in U.S.).  Internet backbones collect money from both parties that send 
and receive traffic.11
  
6. In Networks, Price Discrimination Schemes can be Complex 
A firm controlling a required component in a network (or a firm with significant 
market power in a component) could collect a licensing fee from firms in complementary 
markets.  Because a network may have different degrees of market power on different 
sides of the market, a firm that controls a proprietary platform (i) sets a price strategically 
for its end-user products; and (ii) collects a fee for complementary products to its 
platform sold by other firms.  For example, game platforms (Sony, Xbox, Nintendo) set 
the price for their game consoles as well as collect licensing fees or royalties from 
software developers.   
Conversely, Microsoft, besides selling Windows to computer manufacturers and 
end users, also subsidizes in kind complementary applications to its operating system by 
                                                 
11 The exception in this is when the backbones are not in a peering relationship where, by bilateral 
agreement, no money changes hands for traffic that originates and terminates in the two peering networks.  
See Economides (2005). 
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(i) including in its operating system subroutines that are useful to applications developers 
but are not useful to end users; and (ii) providing information and resources to application 
developers.12  Similarly, in payment systems, firms typically collect money from card 
holders as well as from merchants.  In principle, a payment system could collect money 
on only one side on the market and subsidize the other side of the market. 
 
7. Network Effects or Network Externalities? 
Often the additional subscriber/user/merchant/content provider is not rewarded for 
the benefit that he/she brings to others by subscribing to or creating a transaction in a 
network.  Hence there may be “externalities,” that is, benefits not fully intermediated by 
the market.  In some cases, externalities are fully intermediated through non-linear 
pricing (quantity discounts).  A good example of this was Cantor Fitzgerald pricing 
towards Salomon Brothers in the secondary U.S. bonds market before 2001.  A typical 
trader paid $20 per $1 million bond face value traded.  Salomon paid $1 per $1 million 
bond face value plus a (small) fixed fee.  Why?  Salomon brought immense liquidity to 
Cantor’s secondary market because it controlled 40% of the primary market being the 
largest primary dealer.13  This is an example of a strategy to offer discount pricing based 
on volume to take advantage of network effects.  This strategy was very successful for 
Cantor which kept its dominant position with over 70% market share despite an 
inefficient trading platform.  Similarly, large merchants may be offered better terms 
because of the liquidity/business they bring to a credit card network. 
                                                 
12 See Economides and Katsamakas (2006). 
13 The United States distributes (sells) its debt through a limited number of primary dealers.  See 
Economides (1994). 
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 8. Winner-Takes-Most Markets 
Markets with strong network effects where firms can choose to be incompatible 
exhibit a natural inequality, that is, they are “winner-takes-most” markets.  In these 
markets, there is extreme market shares, prices and profits inequality.  The market share 
of the largest firm can be a multiple of the market share of the second largest, the second 
largest firm’s market share can be a multiple of the market share of the third, and so on.  
For example, the equilibrium market shares can be 66%, 22%, 7%, 2.5%, 1%, …  The 
geometric sequence of market shares implies that, even for small number of firms n, the 
nth firm’s market share is tiny.  Why do we observe the market share, prices and profits 
inequality?  A firm with a large market share has more complementary goods and 
therefore its good is more valuable to consumers.  Why then isn’t monopoly the 
equilibrium?  Why is the equilibrium “winner-takes-most” and not “winner-takes-all”?  
Because for a firm with a large market share to reach monopoly it requires a cut in its 
price that is unprofitable.  Based its own profit consideration and not on fear of antitrust 
intervention, a firm with a very large market share will allow smaller firms to survive 
rather than using aggressive strategies to drive them out of business. 
This type of equilibrium is typically observed in (i) the PC operating systems 
market; (ii) in software applications markets; (iii) in hits in blogs; (iv) in hits in Internet 
search engines; (v) in market shares of firms in traditional Yellow pages; and (vi) in the 
size distribution of connections of Internet hosts, among other markets. 
Because of natural inequality in the market structure of network industries, there 
should be no presumption that anti-competitive actions are responsible for the creation of 
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market share inequality or very high profitability of a top firm.  That is, no anti-
competitive acts are necessary to create this inequality. 
In the payments systems market, customers can use a number of credit cards and 
similarly merchants honor a number of credit cards.  This “two-sided multihoming” may 
mitigate the effects of incompatibility among payment systems networks.  However, the 
lack of pricing flexibility by payment systems in the fees that merchants pay them, 
reduces competition among these networks. 
 
 
9. Concluding Remarks 
 
 We discussed various aspects of the vertical relationship between merchants and 
payment systems networks.  We discussed the two-sided nature of a payment system, the 
fact that such systems are incompatible, the existence of network effects, the two-sided 
multihoming nature of the network where users have typically more than one card and 
merchants honor more than one card, as well as pricing within a payment systems 
network, such as the network-wide setting of the interchange fee.  We further discussed 
the incentives of merchants to extend vertically into payments systems, noting that this 
incentive is maximized when there is significant market power in payments systems and 
merchants are not sufficiently compensated for the business they bring to the network. 
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